Abstract
Introduction
Controversy regarding the interaction of housing supply, economic growth and 'banked', vacant, stalled, dormant or derelict sites has been a recurring feature of British urban policy. Since the global financial crisis, the failure by developers to implement projects which have planning permission has been a source of frustration for central and local government. At a national level, central government has viewed increased housing market and development activity as a key mechanism to stimulate the macro-economy. In September 2012, the Mayor of London stated that there were 170,000 dwellings in stalled developments in the UK capital 1 . He suggested that that these developments were stalled for a number of reasons; inability to access development and mortgage finance, overpayments for sites and unviable planning obligations were mentioned.
Drawing upon the research results of a government-sponsored research project, this paper provides an analysis of the nature and causes of stalled development projects. It analyses a national database of stalled projects to identify broad patterns and, in addition, investigates a sample of case studies to identify the detailed factors that may result in lack of progress for schemes with planning permission.
The paper therefore begins with a discussion of the, perhaps nebulous, concept of a 'stalled' site and discusses the range of factors that can result in the non-implementation of a planning permission.
Drawing upon a national database and case studies, the third section sets out the method and data sources used to investigate the scope, types and causes of stalled sites in England. This is followed by a discussion of the findings from the data analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
Defining Stalled Sites
In 2011 The UK Government launched the 'Get Britain Building' programme as part of the Government's Housing Strategy. The programme aims to unlock locally-backed stalled sites with planning permission and deliver up to 16,000 new homes. Stalled sites are defined, albeit quasistatutorily as follows:
"Stalled sites (which could be a standalone phase within a wider scheme) will be defined as those where there has been no construction activity on the relevant phase since 1 September 2011 (excluding site clearance / remediation, affordable housing delivery construction where it has been possible to progress this in advance of other elements of the site and / or limited activity to implement or maintain a planning permission)"
Whilst the specific date is there for operational reasons, the key point is that a site is 'shovel ready'
with planning permission (including a S106 agreement) in place. In essence, a stalled site is defined broadly as a scheme with planning permission that is NOT being implemented. However, if we view 1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/davehillblog/2012/sep/20/boris-johnson-london-housing-crisis-andrew-boff stalled sites through the framework of an event-event production system model, this definition seems restrictive. In the standard event sequence models of the development process, there are many events that typically precede award of full planning permission (see Ball, 2010 for a description). Typically the process begins with the identification of the development opportunity, land assembly, feasibility analysis, regulatory approval etc. Using a definition that defines a site as stalled after planning permission has been obtained means that, what has been described as, the most time-consuming and difficult elements of the development process can be omitted from an analysis of stalled sites focussed on post-planning factors (Healey, 1992) . The GBB approach narrowly defines development projects as stalled when the regulatory conditions for physical implementation have been fulfilled. Yet it is clear, following Healey's review of the UK development process (Healey, 1991) , that there are many planning-related events that precede physical implementation of a development project at which a development opportunity can become stalled. The (by no means comprehensive) sequence of events In terms of identifying stalled sites, one key issue is how long these stages normally take? It might be expected that a site should only be defined as stalled when an abnormal time period has lapsed since the last event in the development process. Work by London Development Research involving 509
housing schemes (consisting of 10 or more homes) completed in London during 2006 found that eight months was a typical period between grant of full planning consent and start of construction (DCLG, 2007, 35) . Given the buoyant development market conditions prevalent at this time, this study provides a useful indicator of normal delay between planning permission and implementation.
One advantage of the Get Britain Building definition above is that it is fairly straightforward to classify sites as stalled. However, the narrowness of this definition also needs to be interpreted in the context of its purpose. The definition of a stalled site guides researchers where, in the Popperian sense, to 'shine the torch' in terms of identifying causation. Clearly, when explaining why a development scheme is stalled, certain factors may have different levels of significance at different stages in the site 'production system'. Given the objectives of the government to stimulate housing supply in the short-term, the Get Britain Building scheme was essentially targeted at sites where construction could commence rapidly. However, as pointed out above, it is also the case that sites may be 'blocked' much further back in the 'planning pipeline'. For instance, in some situations there can a resolution to grant permission but, for whatever reason, the s106 agreement has not been agreed between the local planning authority and developer(s). Even further back in the 'pipeline', failure to agree on key issues at pre-application negotiations may mean that sites are stalled because the local planning authority and the applicant cannot reach agreement on key issues. Effectively, the result may be that the site is 'stalled' because of planning obligations at an earlier stage in the planning system. Whilst it seems reasonable to infer that sites stalled at an earlier stage in the planning process are more likely to be stalled for planning reasons, it is also the case that a proportion of such sites have a long planning history in which this may simply be the 'latest instalment'.
A specific situation seems to be indicated in the Get Building Britain definition of stalled sites. It is that the developer has obtained planning permission, signed a s106 agreement, etc. but is currently unable to implement the permission because the development is not (sufficiently) profitable with its current permission. The implication is that a downturn in market conditions has made a once viable development now financially unviable. Recent Government policy has sought to address this 'viability problem' by introducing a series of measures that might render the development viable once again. These include:
 A direct financial subsidy  A re-negotiation of the s106 agreement  A re-negotiation of other terms of the planning application However, there may be other explanations for non-implementation of permission to develop unrelated to the terms of the planning permission, associated planning obligations or, indeed, market conditions. Drane (2013) pointed out that sites that appear static to the naked eye may, in fact, be the locus of substantial development-related activity such as re-zoning and transfers of ownership. It is also possible that a landowner may have agreed a s106 agreement without intending to commence development or to sell land in order to secure the principle of development on the site or to avoid higher levels of planning obligations. This is sometimes termed in the development industry as 'banking a permission'; the implication being that the planning permission is 'deposited' until it needs to be 'drawn down' at a later date. Similarly, although there may be further issues to be addressed before construction can commence, a developer or landowner may need to secure planning permission in order to meet the terms of funding or option agreements.
Another potential factor is that a proportion of stalled sites will become part of the asset base or 'land bank' of house-building companies. Land banks serve a dual purpose: to provide a resource for the construction of new real estate and to provide a portfolio of assets for land investment. There is a longstanding literature on the issue of land-banking by major house building companies (see White, 1986 problems with apartment developments with the developer exposed to "capital lock-up linked to inability to phase sales… and greater exposure to uncertainties in demand" (KPMG, 2008, 8 Adams, Baum and McGregor, 1988 and Adams, Disberry, Hutchinson and Munjoma, 2001 ). This work has suggested that ownership problems and behaviour can undermine the standard neo-classical assumptions that land supply responds to market signals to produce development at the right time, in the right place and at the right price. It found that urban sites may not be brought forward for development because of a combination of passive ownership (encouraged by low holding costs), fragmented ownership rights and speculative behaviour. Prior to the Global Financial Crisis, in order to promote land supply in what was an increasingly buoyant housing market in the UK, Barker (2004) proposed amendments to the property taxation system to encourage the more rapid re-use of urban sites.
In addition, following Titman (1985) there is a body of US literature analysing the behaviour of vacant site owners from a real options perspective. Essentially, owners' decisions on whether to sell a site to a developer are analysed in terms of weighing the opportunity costs associated with keeping the site vacant against the expected gain from delaying sale until more favourable market conditions. This body of work suggests that the value of the call option to wait (i.e. hold back land from development) increases in more volatile or uncertain market conditions and so may explain, at least in part, why sites appear increasingly stalled at present. More recent work on the optimal phasing and inventory issues in real estate development also suggests that, for owners of large and/or multiple sites, it can be economically rational to phase the release of land incrementally over time (Hughen, Ott and Read, 2011) . This type of strategic behaviour by landowners has clear links to the controversy concerning 'land hoarding' by house-building companies discussed above.
Although it is specific to the current English planning policy environment, a further factor that may be producing a lack of progress on some sites is the option increasingly offered to landowners to revisit and renegotiate planning agreements. In order to kick start stalled development sites government guidance has been issued on the review of schemes that have stalled for 'financial viability' reasons (HCA, 2012) . The guidance suggests that local planning authorities 'review the degree of flexibility'
around delivery of planning components, namely land use, design, master plan, infrastructure and housing provision and carbon reduction. Essentially it encourages local authorities to look again at the planning requirements of these stalled schemes. The Government has also, via the Growth and In summary, it is clear that the sharp economic downturn has affected the financial viability of many development projects that have managed to navigate the planning system. However, despite the current political salience, surprisingly little systematic research has been carried out on the type, location and number of stalled sites. If the policy objective to increase housing supply is to be achieved, there is a limited evidence base on which to construct related policy.
Data and Method
The research utilises two sources of information relating to sites with planning permission that are perceived to be stalled: a national database of construction projects supplied by Glenigan and a case study analysis of specific stalled sites. This mixed methods approach was conceived as a way to build both a broader picture of the prevalence of stalled sites (at the national scale), and an opportunity to 'drill-down' to explore the specific factors stalling schemes at the individual site level. As Fellows and Liu (2008: 28) note, combining qualitative and qualitative approaches in this way can provide a "multi-dimensional view of the subject, gained through synergy".
National database
A data set of stalled sites was obtained from Glenigan. Glenigan is a private sector provider of construction and property development-related data including planning applications, permissions, construction tenders, contracts and completions. For the purposes of this project, Glenigan supplied a snapshot of data that described the nature, scale and location of 'stalled' development schemes in 
Case Studies
The purpose of the case studies was to focus on specific stalled projects in order to examine more depth the rationales and situations of site owners. In order to ensure we have projects from each region and representing different types of development, it was decided that targeting a total of approximately 20 case studies would provide an adequate sample to obtain evidence of the factors that can stall development. Although this is a small number relative to the total number of stalled development sites across England, it nonetheless captures a broad range of sites in terms of location and size. This diversity was also reflected in the composition of the schemes. For example, a number were large, urban extensions incorporating community and commercial facilities as well as large residential elements. At the other end of the scale, there were a number of sites with planning permission for a few dozen dwellings.
Similarly, a diverse range of planning obligations had been agreed. It is important to point out here that the aim of the research was to provide an in-depth evaluation of each site rather than to generate a sample that could be used to make inferences regarding significant differences between different categories of site. Thus, whilst an attempt was made to cover a range of value areas and size of schemes, it is not possible to make any inferences about differences in the role of planning obligations between the categories of site. Put simply, the case studies will not provide answers to questions such as "Are planning obligations having different types of impact in large/low value/mixed use sites?"
This, in our view, does not devalue the usefulness of the data provided by a selected range of case studies. Indeed individual and unusual or unique cases may reveal much about general processes, whether they are 'scaled-up' or not (see Sayer, 1992 , Ettlinger, 2009 ). However, we do acknowledge that care must be taken not to over-generalise when abstracting results from case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2001 , Yin, 2008 . The sample of stalled sites was purposively generated from a combination of sites suggested by local planning authorities, developers, a project advisory group and the personal knowledge of the research team. The composition of the sample was therefore not based on random sampling but rather reflected the willingness of individuals to put forward examples to us.
We divided the country into three broad value areas:
 'High' -London, South East,  'Medium' -South West and East of England  'Low' -East and West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and North East and North
West
As each case study was submitted, we reviewed whether it was within a local authority which was of a much higher/lower value than the majority of local authorities in the value band. If this was the case, drawing upon DCLG data on local authority house prices, we allocated the case study to a more appropriate value band. Schemes were defined as being either large (100 dwellings or more) or small (less than 100 dwellings). The initial 'convenient' sample of stalled sites set out in table 1 shows a number of characteristics.
43% of all stalled sites suggested by local planning authorities etc. are in low house price regions compared with 31% in high price regions and 26% in medium price regions. However, the incidence of dwellings in stalled sites is slightly different with fewer dwellings (33%) in the low price areas and more dwellings (38%) in the medium price area. Urban extensions account for 15% of all sites but 71% of all dwellings and ranged in size from under 1,000 units to more than 4,000 units. 28% of all dwellings in stalled sites are located in suburban areas with 58% in urban areas. Very few examples of stalled sites in London were identified. There were 11 non-residential stalled schemes: six of these were in high price areas, four in medium value areas and only one in low value areas.
From this initial sample of 138 suggested case studies, we obtained agreement for a detailed assessment from developers and local authority planners at 18 sites. Having gathered data on the permitted schemes, the assessment also involved semi-structured interviews with representatives from developers/landowners and the local authority planning officer. The sites represent a spread of location types (urban, suburban, greenfield/urban extension) within each of the three value bands (low, medium, high) -broadly representative of their proportions in the sample of 138 schemes.
-high value areas
4 -medium value areas 7 -low value areas Given commercial and negotiating sensitivities, we had to reassure the appropriate parties that no individual site or scheme would be identifiable in the research results. The interviews were mainly conducted by telephone during October and November 2012. Since a number of the interviewees expressed a preference for a telephone interviews, the vast majority of interviews were conducted by telephone rather than face-to-face. There did not seem to be any substantive difference in tone and content between the two approaches to the interviews. Two researchers were present at most of the interviews. Both interviewers took notes of the responses. Consistent with the semi-structured approach, the interviews were informal and exploratory.
Results

Number, location and types of stalled sites
In terms of a national picture, Table 2 categorises the stalled developments according to their predominant land use (as assigned by Glenigan). The vast majority are residential-led (either apartments or houses). Residential-led stalled projects account for 94% of the sites and 95% of the units and are the focus of subsequent analysis. Table 000 shows that nearly two thirds of stalled residential schemes are apartment-led developments with houses and bungalows accounting for a third and specialist housing (student accommodation and sheltered housing) accounting for around 4%. This can be compared to dwelling completions in the 2012/13 which were 24% flats and 76% houses 2 . Source: Glenigan data set Ignoring the permission granted for one site on 07/12/01, the residential-led stalled developments received planning permissions between 29/02/04 and 29/05/12. Figure 1 shows the numbers of currently stalled schemes categorised by the date of planning permission. Not unexpectedly, a small proportion of stalled sites (in July 2012) were granted planning permission before the global financial crisis. In 2008-9, there was a significant increase in the numbers of sites stalled that were granted permission in these years. This shift has continued for 2010 and 2011. However, given that the planning permissions are relatively recent, a proportion of the non-implemented planning permissions may be due to 'normal' delays in construction procurement, execution of sales to house-builders etc.
rather than any fundamental problems with the schemes. It is also possible that a proportion of planning permissions granted in 2010 and 2011 were renewals or changes to existing schemes. Stalled sites that were granted planning permission between October 2010 and September 2011 are classified by region in Table 3 and compared to the number of major permissions granted in the same year. As a proportion of all major decisions, the region with the largest percentage of stalled sites is the North East (17%), the region with the lowest median house price. It is notable that the proportions for all other regions are fairly consistent, ranging between 5% and 8%. Broadly, we do not find significant regional differences in the propensity for sites to stall. The residential sites were linked to the UK Postcode Directory using the postcode as the common identifier. Not all sites had a valid postcode (there were 128 mismatches). Table 4 shows that most of the stalled sites are located within urban settlements with a population of 10,000 or more and in a less sparsely populated hinterland. This rather vague definition comes from the UK Postcode Directory and is based on an Ordnance Survey classification but it illustrates that the majority are located on brownfield sites. Because brownfield sites typically have a higher existing use value than greenfield sites and are more likely to be apartment schemes, they tend to be more marginal in terms of financial viability. It is therefore not surprising that most of the stalled sites are brownfield. Source: Glenigan It is expected that the level of house prices will also affect the propensity of development projects to stall. Dividing the 2010 median house price for each of the 326 unitary authorities into quintiles and summing the number of stalled units in each reveals a negative correlation between average house price and number of stalled units. Source: DCLG (Live Table 582 ) and Glenigan Table 6 Source: DCLG (Live Table 582 ) and Glenigan Therefore, aside from the North East no major regional variation was found in the propensity of sites to be stalled. However, and perhaps not surprisingly, Tables 5 and 6 suggest that a key issue is local house prices and land values. 
Case study results
Turning to look at the more site-specific scale, the 18 case studies can be broadly categorised as follows (the definitions have been devised for this study): 
The greenfield schemes are similar in character, typically taking the form of urban extensionshousing developments adjoining existing settlements. Depending on their scale, they include different types and levels of transport provision, community and other facilities as well as dedicated open space. The previously developed sites, on the other hand, are more diverse. They include heavily contaminated and difficult-to-develop former factory sites in dense urban (city centre) locations.
There are also examples of small (e.g. for 50 dwellings) redevelopment schemes where demolition of an existing building (e.g. a former pub or hotel) is part of the planning permission and urban infill schemes where little is required to bring the site forward for development and development conditions are benign.
Scale and Nature of Planning Obligations
Across the case studies, a diverse range of planning obligations 3 had been agreed. Housing developments above a certain size must include a proportion of affordable dwellings (social, shared equity or affordable rented housing). Only one scheme above the local site size threshold had agreed no provision for affordable housing, and this was on viability grounds. Where affordable housing was sought, the amount varied, although not as much as expected given the range of market values and development conditions found in the case studies.
Albeit with sample sizes too small to draw any statistical inferences, the expected pattern of higher levels of affordable housing in higher value areas was found. In the high and medium value areas, seven out of ten s106 agreements were for 20% to 30% of the total number of units to be affordable and three for over 30%, the highest being 40%. In the low value area, 20% to 25% was the most common proportion although there was one scheme at 0% and one with a requirement for more than 30%. Planning obligations other than affordable housing were scheme-specific, depending on measures required to mitigate the impact of the development: the larger the scheme, the more diverse the requirements. These included the expected types of planning obligations; highways works, public transport and education contributions, community facilities, public art, play areas and recreation facilities, etc.
As well as variety in the make-up of the contributions required, the case studies varied in the amount of contribution per dwelling, as the following analysis illustrates:
3 These are agreed under section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act and are therefore usually referred to as s106 agreements.
 Small scheme/high value area -£3,700 per dwelling (no affordable housing -below threshold)
 Large scheme/medium value area -£13,000 per dwelling + 30% affordable housing  Large scheme/high value area -£2,800 per dwelling + 35% affordable housing  Small scheme/low value area -£3,000 dwelling + 25% affordable housing  Large scheme/low value area -£1,800 per dwelling + 0% affordable housing
Scheme Histories
Although each site had its own particular 'journey' through the development and planning processes, there are some similarities in the time and effort required to achieve a planning permission. There are several examples of schemes that have taken over ten years from an initial allocation in a development plan to planning permission and at least one example of a scheme that has taken more than 20 years. It is not possible to provide a simple analysis of the dates when the case studies were first 'promoted' for development since some schemes were allocated in a development plan and others were 'windfall sites'; the first time the latter are identified to the planning authority is as a planning application. There can also be complications where the extant planning permission is not the first permission granted on the site. Nevertheless, Table 7 groups the case studies according to the length of time between first securing planning permission and the case study interviews (2012). The majority of the case studies had been granted planning permission within the last five years but three had older planning permissions. It is important to bear in mind that some planning permissions that were granted relatively recently may in fact relate to an application first submitted several years earlier.
Reasons for stalled schemes
One of the objectives of this research was to investigate the extent to which the level of planning obligations is stalling development. This requires a focus on particular sites where the developer has obtained planning permission, signed an s106 agreement but is currently failing to implement the permission. The implication is that a change in market conditions has rendered a once viable 4 One case study was composed of a series of small schemes, each with variable planning histories. 5 In all these cases, there was a resolution to grant permission but the s106 agreement was still being negotiated. development now financially unviable. Identifying causation in this type of exercise can be difficult and overall the interviews revealed a complex picture. It was notable that for the 18 case studies, 41 reasons for non-implementation of the planning permission were recorded. This indicates that multiple factors were affecting individual sites. Even isolating as opposed to measuring the contribution of a factor to an observed outcome can be problematic. The results of the interview survey reveal the types of complications that can emerge. In order for a site to be 'shovel-ready', a number of changes may need to occur. In terms of project implementation, the market may need to improve through increases in prices and turnover. Project implementation may require a renegotiation of the planning permission in order to change the scale and mix of the development and also, in some cases, to reduce the level of planning obligations. In addition, there may be issues relating to the site or with landowners that need to be resolved before a planning permission can be implemented. The interviews reveal examples of all these types of issues and their consequent impact on the negotiation of planning obligations.
An analysis of the case studies shows that changed market conditions are the key reason for sites becoming stalled. However, it is not the only reason and there is usually a combination of factors determining whether a site is stalled or progressing. Table 8 sets out the main reasons put forward for delays in bringing schemes forward (there could be more than one reason for each case study). When the developer/landowner is faced with the changed market circumstances, they have to decide whether to proceed or to, as one interviewee put it, he was 'waiting for the market to improve'. This can be equally true for the developer (unwilling to risk the expenditure on getting a scheme started) and the landowner (not willing to reduce the price they expect to receive for their land).
However, it was also acknowledged that it was not possible to separate the causal factors neatly and that, in a falling market with reduced sales volumes, a reduced level of planning obligations (especially affordable housing) could improve viability sufficiently to get a scheme underway. Putting aside the problem of high levels upfront infrastructure costs often required to progress large-scale developments, another factor leading to some sites stalling relates to land ownership. This can involve a third party with control over a vital piece of land and/or issues to be resolved within a developer and/or landowner consortium. For instance, in two of the case studies, although planning permission had been granted, the sites were occupied and trading as businesses (one was a hotel and the other a car showroom) so they could not realistically be construed as 'shovel ready'. On one of the larger sites the developer decided that it would be preferable to agree planning obligations and outline consent as soon as possible due to imminent changes in the policy regarding planning obligations. Without any intention to implement the agreed planning consent, the developer did not want to delay obtaining the principle of consent on the site and risk potentially more onerous obligations being imposed by planning officers at a later date. In addition, there were four landowners involved in the scheme and it was difficult to get them all to agree to market the site when land prices were falling. On another large scheme, land ownership issues were still being resolved and the developer did not control all land. Compulsory purchase procedures and negotiations with other landowners were underway. It was also clear in some of the case studies that the existing consent would not be implemented and would have to be re-negotiated.
Overall, it was clear that the shift in market conditions had created a range of reactions amongst landowners (usually not house-builders) with the result that consents were unlikely to be result in construction activity in the short-term.
Conclusion
Albeit at a different scale, the problem of stalled sites is akin to urban regeneration interventions that aim to overcome risk aversion and economic viability problems associated with (re)development in weak economic conditions. With a national rather than a local focus, addressing the housing supply crisis is viewed by the government as potentially providing part of a strategy aimed at 'regenerating' the macro-economy. A range of stimulus measures has been used, and continues to be introduced, to encourage and enable the house-building sector to increase output. Implicit in the attempts to subsidise stalled projects is the presumption that projects are stalled because they are not financially viable. Hence, through programmes such as Get Britain Building, the Growing Places Fund and the New Homes Bonus among others, public funds are offered to developers to pay for infrastructure costs, to improve viability and, in addition, local planning authorities are pressed to re-negotiate and reduce levels of planning obligations. However, policy formation seems to be taking place in an evidential vacuum; essentially the type, nature and causes of stalled projects seem to be poorly understood.
At the macro-level, the empirical evidence on the location and type of stalled projects suggests that financial viability is likely to be the primary driver. Stalled projects are more likely to be found in low house value areas and/or higher risk projects and/or projects in sectors that have experienced the largest house price falls. The high proportion of stalled projects in apartment developments is a clear finding in this context. Indeed, claims that use broad-brush figures about the number of units with planning permission do not take into account the fact that a large proportion of schemes are unlikely to be viable. The overarching shifts are that house values have fallen in many areas, developers' and lenders' risk aversion has increased and, as a result, once viable financially feasible projects are no longer feasible. At current market prices and development costs, housing development is not viable on a substantial proportion of, what is often defined as, the supply of housing land.
Furthermore, the case study research suggests that the reasons for many stalled projects may be more nuanced than simply viability. For operational reasons, house-builders need to maintain an inventory of sites in order to manage their workflow. However, some house-building companies may be operating as land investment vehicles as well as house-building businesses. Nevertheless, problems with stalled projects cannot be wholly attributed to house-builder behaviour. Previous research has suggested that house-builders own a small proportion of stalled sites with planning permission and a number of our case study sites were not own by house-building companies. Other landowners seem to be exercising their options to delay the sale of their sites. Although a site may appear inactive, it is clear that the lack of physical development may be due to ownership conflicts, problems of land title, land transfers, etc. In addition, we find evidence of landowners 'banking' permissions in order to protect themselves from changes in policy. For this type of scheme, planning permissions need to be re-negotiated before development can commence.
is often not a sufficient condition and it is unlikely that a significant proportion of stalled sites, even if financially viable, could be considered 'shovel-ready'. A better understanding of the typical events that occur after a site has obtained planning permission is needed before we can understand the key barriers to the implementation of a planning permission. Although policy is concentrating on viability as a root cause of stalled sites, the reality is not so straightforward; a range of factors can cause a site to be stalled and causality must be understood for policy interventions to be effective.
Macroeconomic conditions in the capital and labour markets; housing demand and supply at national, regional and local levels; the poorly-understood trade-off between house-building and land speculation; and site-specific factors such as land assembly, sunk costs, infrastructure requirements etc., all require further investigation.
